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Abstract
Some travel demand management policies such as road pricing have been widely studied in literature. Rationing poli-
cies, including vehicle ownership quota and vehicle usage restrictions, have been implemented in several megaregions
to address congestion and other negative transportation externalities, but not well explored in literature. Other strategies
such as Vehicle Mileage Fee have not been well accepted by policy makers, but attract growing research interest. As
policy makers face an increasing number of policy tools, a theoretical framework is needed to analyze these policies and
provide a direct comparison of their welfare implications such as eﬃciency and equity. However, such a comprehensive
framework does not exist in literature. To bridge this gap, this study develops an analytical framework for analyzing
and comparing travel demand management policies, which consists of a mathematical model of joint household vehicle
ownership and usage decisions and welfare analysis methods based on compensating variation and consumer surplus.
Under the assumptions of homogenous users and single time period, this study ﬁnds that vehicle usage rationing per-
forms better when relatively small percentages of users (i.e. low rationing ratio) are rationed oﬀ the roads and when
induced demand elasticity resulting from congestion mitigation is low. When the amount of induced demand exceeds a
certain level, it is shown analytically that vehicle usage restrictions will always cause welfare losses. When the policy
goal is to reduce vehicle travel by a ﬁxed portion, road pricing provides a larger welfare gain. The performance of
diﬀerent policies is inﬂuenced by network congestion and congestibility. This paper further generalizes the model to
consider heterogenous users and demonstrates how it can be applied for policy analysis on a real network after careful
calibration.
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1. Introduction
Policy makers and researchers have proposed various policy tools to mitigate ever-growing congestion
by allocating scarce road space more eﬃciently. Road pricing, the probably most well-known travel demand
management policy, has been extensively studied in literature (e.g (Mohring & Harwitz, 1962; Arnott &
Small, 1994; Verhoef, 2002; Zhang & Ge, 2004; Brownstone & Small, 2005) among others). The ﬁrst-
best pricing, when achievable, is an eﬃciency way to mitigate negative externality generated by traﬃc.
However, road pricing has been controversial among the public because of its 1) similarity to another tax; 2)
hefty transaction cost; 3) concerns on welfare distributional eﬀects (Giuliano, 1994; Harrington et al., 2001;
Yang et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2008); 4) and privacy concerns due to certain fare collection technology.
In contrast, rationing as a policy tool does not involve any fee transaction and has been regarded as more
equitable in resource allocation by some researchers in other industries (e.g. Evans, 1983). In general,
rationing, or quantity control, does not achieve the ﬁrst-best situation. But they could become very useful
when we are dealing with basic life necessity (e.g. water in Renwick & Archibald (1998)), or when the price
elasticity is too small (Guesnerie & Roberts, 1984). However, its role as a policy tool to address congestion
problem has barely been studied in literature. Several studies focused on early experience in Singapore (Koh
& Lee, 1994; Toh & Phang, 1997; Smith & Chin, 1997; Koh, 2003). A few existing studies in other regions
includes (Daganzo, 1995; Eskeland & Feyzioglu, 1997; Davis, 2008; Nakamura & Kockelman, 2002). The
authors pointed out several limitations in current studies and recommended further research in this ﬁeld.
While the eﬀects of rationing in transportation have not been well understood, it has been implemented in
several metropolitan areas. For example, Singapore started the Vehicle Quota System(VQS) in 1990 (Barter,
2005), which only releases a limited number of vehicle purchase permits each month through auctions. A
similar quota system was adopted in Shanghai, China in 2001. A more drastic vehicle ownership rationing
scheme, where residents can only acquire the vehicle purchase permits through monthly lottery, was recently
implemented in Beijing, China (Lim, Accessed on Arpil 8). Rationing policies can be applied not only to
vehicle ownership, but also to vehicle usage. For example, several Latin American countries introduced
vehicle usage restriction measures due to emissions and air quality concerns in metropolitan area. Mexico
City administration imposed a regulation banning each car from driving on a speciﬁc day of the week
according to their license plate number in 1989 (dubbed as “Day without a Car”). Similarly regulation has
been adopted by Sao Paulo, Brazil, Bogota´, Columbia, Quito, Ecuador, and Santiago, Chile(Davis, 2008).
As congestion and air pollution problems deteriorate, vehicle usage restriction has been extended to some
smaller cities, such as Medellı´n and Cali, with less than two million residents each. Outside Latin America,
vehicle usage restriction is also seen in Beijing, China, Manila, Philippines, Lagos, Nigeria (Thomson,
1998), Athens, Greece (Kambezidis et al., 1995), as well as Guangzhou, China during the 2010 Asian
Games (Hao et al., 2010).
As new technologies such as hybrid and electric vehicles emerge, some researchers propose policies
such as Vehicle Mileage Fee that could serve both as solutions to decreasing gas tax (ironically due to the
increased fuel eﬃciency) and travel demand management tools. As policy makers face an increasing number
of policy tools, a theory is needed to analyze diﬀerent pricing and rationing policies under an integrated
framework and provide a direct comparison of their welfare implications such as eﬃciency and equity.
However, such a theoretical framework does not exist in literature. To bridge this theoretical gap, this study
develops an analytical framework for analyzing transportation pricing and rationing policies, which consists
of a mathematical model of joint household vehicle ownership and usage decisions and welfare analysis
methods based on compensating variation and consumer surplus. This integrated theoretical model also
supports a direct comparison between rationing policies and pricing policy, and to illustrate their diﬀerence
under various conditions.
2. Theoretical Framework
For a traveler who is facing various travel demand management policies, the decision of owning a ve-
hicle and the decision of using a vehicle are interrelated. Previous studies usually treat road pricing and
vehicle ownership decisions separately, which prevents policy makers from analyzing pricing and rationing
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policies under an integrated framework. To correctly capture these behavioral dynamics in reaction to price
changes and rationing policies, the proposed framework must be able to jointly model vehicle ownership
and usage decisions. This study follows the indirect utility approach initiated by Dubin & McFadden (1984)
in their study about residential electric appliance holdings and consumption because of its solid foundation
in consumer behavior theory. Hausman (1985) developed similar framework in his work on wages and
labour force participation. This approach was ﬁrst introduced to the ﬁeld of transportation by Mannering
& Winston (1985) (an early version was presented at the 1982 Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society)
in their seminal work on household vehicle ownership and utilization. They also extended this approach
from static to dynamic models and addressed several econometric issues in model estimation. Train (1985)
provided another early application on car ownership study. Following these early works, many researchers,
including Winston & Mannering (1984); Hensher et al. (1992); De Jong (1990); Goldberg (1998), and West
(2004) have further extended and applied this indirect utility approach in various context (De Jong et al.
(2004) provided a review).
In this study, we consider a household who seeks to maximize its utility under a budget constraint. We
consider two goods: vehicle usage (A) and all other goods (X). The household faces a discrete choice of
owning vehicles and a continuous choice of vehicle usage conditional on the ownership choice. This joint
decision gives the consumption of vehicle usage and determines vehicle ownership. The consumption of
vehicle usage and all other goods yield positive marginal utility. Many functional forms have been used
as conditional indirect utility in the literature (Mannering & Winston, 1985; Winston & Mannering, 1984;
West, 2004). We choose the double log speciﬁcation in this study because the utility level of choosing not
to own a vehicle is endogenous with this form. This function form has previous been used by (De Borger &
Mayeres, 2007) in investigating optimal taxation of optimal car ownership, car use, and public transport.
From De Jong (1990), we assume the demand for driving Ai units of distance (e.g. measured in annual
Vehicle Mile Traveled (VMT)) by a household i with annual income Yi is determined by:
ln Ai = αi ln(Yi −C) − βi p + ηi + ei (1)
where: p is the operating cost per mile for the vehicle;
C represents the annualized capital cost of owning a car;
ηi summarizes observed heterogeneity such as household socio-economic and demographic characteris-
tics;
ei summarizes heterogeneity unobservable to researchers;
and αi and βi are parameters.
Following Burtless & Hausman (1978), the corresponding indirect utility function is:
V(p,Yi −C) = 1
βi
exp(ηi + ei − βi p) + 11 − αi (Yi −C)
1−αi (2)
We can easily verify this correspondence by applying Roy’s identity to 2, which gives the demand
function 1. Equation 2 gives the maximum utility on the downward-sloping part of the budget line (where
people choose to own a vehicle). For each point on that line, we have to compare its utility with the utility
of owning no vehicle (which is always an option) to decide the optimal decision. To derive the utility of
owning no vehicle, De Jong (1990) observed that the optimal decision would be to not drive at all when
operating cost per mile p goes to inﬁnity. Therefore, we have:
lim
p→∞V(p,Yi) = U(0,Yi) (3)
which yields:
U(0,Yi) =
1
1 − αi Y
1−αi
i (4)
Here U(0,Yi) represents the utility of owning no vehicle. Because people are not driving in this situation,
the ﬁrst argument, the annual VMT Ai, is 0.
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To avoid unnecessary complexity and to obtain important insights and theoretical ﬁndings, we will
ﬁrst focus on the homogeneous user group, while heterogeneity among travelers will be considered in a
numerical example. Therefore, the terms summarizing the heterogeneity (η and e) and the subscript for
individual household will ﬁrst be dropped.
Under the assumption of homogenous users, all people will choose to own a car if V(p,Y−C) > U(0,Y).
The demand of driving is conditional on the decision of owning a car, following equation 1. As a road
becomes more congested and driving is more costly, some people may give up driving. Because we consider
homogenous drivers, drivers must be indiﬀerent between owning a car and driving Amin miles with it, and
owning no car, which is V(p,Y −C) = U(0,Y). Following the above reasoning, the travel demand curve can
be developed.
To get the network equilibrium and evaluate the welfare implications of diﬀerent policies, a network
supply function must also be speciﬁed. To maintain the tractability of the analysis, we consider a styl-
ized network with only one link and one origin-destination pair. We adopt a ﬂexible network performance
function that allows us to consider networks with diﬀerent congestability (travel time elasticities):
p = φT0(1 + ξ(
q
F
)ϕ) (5)
where:φ is the value of time, which converts travel time into generalized monetary travel cost (in practice,
this problem could be more complicated since not all time periods are equally valuable and we do have a
physical constraint of 24 hours in a day; researchers such as Jara-Diaz (2008) treated time budget separately
from money budget, but this study ignores such diﬀerence for simplication); q is the aggregated travel
demand; and F represents road capacity. T0 captures the free ﬂow time. ξ and ϕ are parameters. In the most
common BPR function, ξ = 0.15, ϕ = 4, while for the less congestable Vickery’s model (Vickrey, 1969),
ϕ = 1.
With both demand and supply function deﬁned, the network equilibrium could be solved. And we use
(p∗, q∗) to denote the equilibrium point before any policy is implemented.
3. Models for Vehicle Ownership and Usage Rationing Policy Analysis
While theoretical studies on road pricing have been abundant in the literature, vehicle usage and own-
ership rationing policies have not been well analyzed. Therefore, before a direct comparison between these
two policies, a theoretical framework must be established for the rationing policies. In this study, we will
analyze the two distinct rationing policies: vehicle ownership rationing and vehicle usage rationing.
3.1. Vehicle Ownership Restriction
For vehicle ownership rationing, we consider a rationing policy that directly limits the total number of
vehicles in the system (although most of such policies target the newly added vehicles through license quota,
they could be interpreted as a control of total vehicles in the future). Under this regulation, only a part of
the population (θ) who are willing to own a vehicle can actually own one, regardless of their willingness to
pay, while the 1 − θ portion of potential drivers will be rationed out from the market. Although households
may choose to own more than one vehicle, we keep the choice between 0 and 1 in this study to avoid
further complication. However, this simpliﬁcation does not prevent us from considering households with
multiple cars in future study. Related work on vehicle choice problem includes those by De Jong (1997) and
Rouwendal & Pommer (2004), among others.
The number of households who are willing to own a vehicle before the policy implementation is P*H,
which can be derived given the initial network equilibrium condition. Here H is the total number of house-
holds. After the vehicle ownership restriction is implemented, the total travel demand becomes
qo = θPHA(p) (6)
Subscript o represents the case of ownership rationing. To be more rigorous, a coeﬃcient need to
be introduced to convert A, the total car miles per year, to trip frequency. For theoretical analysis on a
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stylized network with only one OD and one link, this is less important since the link length is ﬁxed and the
capacity can be adjusted to yearly capacity. As we will see in following sections, this problem becomes very
important when extending the theoretical framework to network analysis. More rigorous treatment will be
introduced in network analysis.
By substituting 6 into equation 2 and then combining with supply function 5, the new equilibrium point,
(q∗∗o , p∗∗o ), can be obtained by solving the following equation set:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
qo = θPHA(p) = θPH(Y −C)α exp(−βp),
p = φT0(1 + ξ(
qo
F
)ϕ).
(7)
The welfare change for the θ portion of households who no longer own a vehicle after rationing policy
implementation could be captured by calculating their compensating variationCVo,1−θ through the following
equation:
U(0,Y −CVo,1−θ) = V(p∗,Y −C) (8)
Equation 8 ensures that by compensating each householdCVo,1−θ, their utility stays the same as the level
before the rationing policy is implemented. Similarly, for the θ portion of households who still keep their
vehicles, compensating variation CVo,θ is calculated by following the same logic:
V(p∗∗o ,Y −CVoθ −C) =
1
β
exp(−βp∗∗o ) +
1
1 − α (Y −C −CVo,θ)
1−α = V(p∗,Y −C) (9)
By combining the welfare impacts for these two group of households, the overall welfare change is:
CVo = PH(θCVo,θ + (1 − θ)CVo,1−θ) (10)
3.2. Vehicle Usage Rationing
For vehicle usage rationing, we consider a “Day without a Car” type of rationing policy under which
each vehicle can only be on the road for λ(0 < λ < 1) portion out of all days. This is also the current
practice of some metropolitan areas, including Beijing, where each vehicle can only drive four out of ﬁve
workdays. It has to be pointed out that there could be a diﬀerence between λ of all working days and all
annual miles, depending on the details of vehicle usage restriction policies. For example, the vehicle usage
restriction system in Beijing is only eﬀective between 6:00AM and 21:00PM, Monday through Friday. It
does not apply during weekends and on national holidays. In this study, we ignore such policy details to
keep the modeling framework tractable. Analysis of complicated policy details are left for future studies.
Vehicle usage rationing is diﬀerent from decreasing the least-wanted (i.e. with the least willingness-to-
pay) 1 − λ of total travel, which is usually assumed in CS-based analysis. To address this diﬀerence, we
derive the indirect utility after usage rationing as follows:
Vusage(p,Y −C) = λV(p,Y −C) + (1 − λ)U(0,Y −C)
=
λ
β
exp(−βp) + 1
1 − α (Y −C)
1−α (11)
where, λV(p,Y − C) is the contribution of the λ portion of the days when a vehicle is allowed to be
driven, while (1 − λ)U(0,Y − C) is the contribution of the λ portion of the days when this vehicle usage is
rationed.
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Applying Roy’s Identity, we can verify that the demand function for individual household derived from
this indirect utility function is consistent with our assumption of the usage rationing policy:
Au(p) = λA(p) = λ(Y −C)α exp(−βp) (12)
The new aggregated travel demand under rationing policy is then given by:
qu(p) = PHAu(p) = λPH(Y −C)α exp(−βp) (13)
Travel is an induced demand which allows people to fulﬁll all other activities occurring at diﬀerent time
and locations. Under vehicle usage rationing, people can not drive during certain days. In the short term,
it may be diﬃcult to ﬁnd replacement activities during the driving days and people would stay at the same
level of travel demand in days when they are allowed to drive. One example is commute driving. People are
unlikely to commute longer or more often during the days when they are allowed to drive. In other words,
such travel demand is not substitutable, especially for the short term. However, in the long term, people may
engage in more activities during the driving days to beneﬁt from the traﬃc reduction due to usage rationing
policy. These induced demand may compromise the beneﬁt from initial traﬃc reduction. As illustrated in
Figure 1, point A represents the case where no induced demand is considered, while point B represents the
case where induced demand does get considered. In Figure 1, area 1 represents welfare losses due to the
amount of driving that is rationed out by the policy, while area 2 represents welfare gains for the remaining
trips that beneﬁt from the short-term travel time reduction. When induced demand is considered, more trips
enter the network and the welfare changes in this scenario is illustrated in Figure 2.
0
0
Total Driving
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
C
o
s
t
p
e
r
M
i
l
e
  
  



 
       
$
%
Fig. 1. Consumer surplus change after usage rationing without induced demand
Given the models representing the two rationing policies, we will analyze their welfare implications
and compare them with the pricing policy. The integrated framework allows us to obtain some interesting
ﬁndings through analytical reasoning under certain conditions. In other cases, numerical examples will be
provided to provide insights.
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Fig. 2. Consumer surplus change after usage rationing with induced demand
4. Analytical Findings
Proposition 1. When induced demand is taken into account, which is the solution of equation 14, vehicle
usage rationing policy will always results in a user welfare loss.
First, a new equilibrium point (q∗∗u , p∗∗u ) will be obtained from the following equations:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
qu = λPHA(p) = λPH(Y −C)α exp(−βp),
p = φT0(1 + ξ(
qu
F
)ϕ)
(14)
For the P portion of population who own a vehicle before the usage rationing policy, their compensating
variation is calculated using the following equation:
λV(p∗∗u ,Y −C −CVu,λ) + (1 − λ)U(0, ,Y −C −CVu,λ) = V(p∗,Y −C) (15)
which is equivalent to:
λ
β
exp(−βp∗∗u ) +
1
1 − α (Y −C −CVu,λ)
1−α =
1
β
exp(−βp∗) + 1
1 − α (Y −C)
1−α (16)
Compensation variation allows the utility of each individual household to stay at the same level. For the
remaining population who do not own a vehicle before the rationing policy, their utility is unchanged since
their income stays the same. Under homogenous user assumption, we do not consider any forward-looking
behavior. If some households are forward-looking, then other households would do the same because of
the homogeneity assumption.In equilibrium, nobody can beneﬁt from such behavior. Therefore, total user
welfare gain is then CVu = PHCVu,λ.
Proof. To prove the proposition, we take ﬁrst-order derivatives on both sides of 16 with respect to λ.
∂CVu
∂λ
= (Y −C −CVu,λ)α exp(−βp∗∗u )[
1
β
− λ∂p
∗∗
u
∂λ
] (17)
Also we can derive ∂p
∗∗
u
∂λ
from 14:
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∂p∗∗u
∂λ
=
1
λ[β + 1
ϕξφT0
( q
∗∗
u
F )
−ϕ]
<
1
λβ
(18)
Thus, substituting 18 into 17, we see ∀λ ∈ [0, 1)
∂CVu
∂λ
> 0 (19)
However, in the extreme case, when the policy rations 0 percentage of vehicle usage (λ = 1), the utility
level should be unchanged and we have CVu = 0. Therefore, we obtain:
CVu(λ) < 0, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1) (20)
Proposition 2. When road pricing and vehicle ownership rationing are set up in such a way that both
policies reduce travel demand by the same amount (or have the same congestion mitigation eﬀects), road
pricing will always generate a bigger social welfare gain.
As discussed in our previous study, vehicle usage rationing policy will always cause a social welfare loss
when induced demand is considered. Thus, in this section, we will only compare road pricing and vehicle
ownership rationing (which is always superior to vehicle usage rationing policy when long-term induced
demand is considered).
If we assume the collected toll will be completely used for the beneﬁt of society and no transaction cost
is applied, the overall social welfare gain with road pricing will be:
Wp = τq∗∗p (21)
where τ represents the price to be charged. Here the toll revenue is used to measure welfare changes
because it captures all the beneﬁts brought by pricing under homogeneous user assumption.
Thus, with equation 21 , we obtained the diﬀerence in social welfare gain for the two policies:
ΔW = (p0 − p∗∗o )q∗∗o − PHθCVo,θ
= θPH[(p0 − p∗∗o )(Y −C)α exp(−βp∗∗o ) −CVo,θ]
(22)
To evaluate the sign of Δ, we only need to consider the part within the parenthesis. We deﬁne h(p∗∗o ),
such that:
h(p∗∗o ) = (p0 − p∗∗o )(Y −C)α exp(−βp∗∗o ) −CVo,θ (23)
We take ﬁrst derivatives with regard to p∗∗o in equation 23 (this is doable because CVo,θ is a function of
p∗∗o ),
dh(p∗∗o )
dp∗∗o
= θPH[−(Y −C)α exp(−βp∗∗o )(1 + β(p0 − p∗∗o )) −
∂CVo,θ
∂p∗∗o
] (24)
where ∂CVo,θ
∂p∗∗o
is obtained by taking ﬁrst derivatives in equation 9:
∂CVo,θ
∂p∗∗o
= −(Y −C −CVo,θ)α exp(−βp∗∗o ) (25)
Thus,
dh(p∗∗o )
dp∗∗o
= exp(−βp∗∗o )[(Y −C −CVo,θ)α − (Y −C)α(1 + β(p0 − p∗∗o ))] < 0 (26)
Since h(p0) = 0,
h(p) > 0,∀p ∈ (0, p0) (27)
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Thus, following equality always holds:
ΔW > 0 (28)
5. Policy Implications from Numerical Examples
Closed form results for welfare changes are not available for several scenarios (e.g. under vehicle usage
restriction policy) in previous analysis. In this section, numerical analysis will be conducted to provide
additional insights on welfare implications of both rationing policies.
Ideally, model parameters should be calibrated with vehicle ownership and usage data, which is beyond
the scope of this paper with a theoretical focus. In this study, we follow the parameters reported by De Jong
(1990):
Income elasticity of driving α = 0.49
Price elasticity of driving β = 0.028
Average annual income Y = 35000
Vehicle Price averaged in years C = 2536
We also set the parameters for supply-side function as: ϕ = 4 and ξ = 0.15 in equation 6, which is
a typical BPR function. We assume the free ﬂow operation cost γT0to be $2 and capacity F to be 14PH
for convenience (as we are only considering an idealized network, the choice of these two parameters only
reﬂects the network capacity relative to travel demand, but does not have a strict physical meaning).
We ﬁrst investigate how two policies perform as the rationing ratio, the most important policy parameter,
varies. Figure 3 presents the usage welfare gain with regard to the remaining portion after rationing(θ for
the case of ownership rationing and λ for the case of usage rationing). In other words, 0.8 on the horizontal
axis means:
• For ownership rationing policy, only 80% of households who want to purchase vehicles are allowed
to do so.
• For usage rationing, vehicle owners can only use their vehicles in 80% of the time (one in every ﬁve
days).
For vehicle ownership rationing, when θ = 0.40, which means to ration out 60% of the vehicles, con-
sumer welfare gain reaches the maximum.
In contrast, with vehicle usage rationing, when λ = 0.82, which means to limit each vehicle roughly to
driving 4 out of 5 weekdays, consumer welfare gain reaches the maximum.
With the same rationing ratio, vehicle usage rationing enjoys a greater social welfare gain when rationing
ratio is small (less than 0.15 under this set of parameters, right side in Figure 3), while ownership rationing
policy oﬀers a greater social welfare gain as rationing ratio increases. This is intuitive because under vehicle
ownership rationing, potential drivers who are rationed out of the market are partially compensated by not
paying the capital cost of buying a vehicle. However, all drivers under vehicle usage rationing have already
paid the initial capital cost. As the rationing ratio increases, the service ﬂow, or utilization, from owning
a vehicle keeps on dropping from vehicle usage rationing. When the utility losses become larger than the
gain from initial capital cost savings, the vehicle usage rationing policy becomes less attractive than vehicle
ownership rationing. In contrast, when the rationing ratio remains small, vehicle usage rationing policy is
more attractive because it oﬀers a deeper cut of travel demand (vehicle ownership rationing is long-term, thus
also leads to induced demand in our analysis). Another interesting question is how policy performance varies
as network congestability diﬀers. We expect both policies to perform better in a network where marginal
cost of driving increases signiﬁcantly as demand increases, compared to a single-bottleneck network where
marginal cost remains constant. Here we use vehicle ownership rationing as an example. Figure 4 compares
the welfare gain of ownership rationing under two supply models as rationing ratio varies from 0 to 1:
From the ﬁgure 4, we see that under the same rationing ratio, the model using BPR function as a supply
function always oﬀers a bigger consumer welfare gain compared to that using Vickrey equation. Therefore,
the rationing policy can perform better under network conditions associated with higher marginal cost.
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considered since it always leads to welfare losses when induced demand is considered)
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Consequently, rationing policies are more likely to succeed in highly congested mega-cities where demand
exceeds capacity.
6. Heterogenous Users
To support the analysis of diﬀerent travel demand management policies in practice,the proposed model
must be capable to consider heterogeneity in behavior and be applicable on large networks with multiple
origin destination pairs. In this section, we extend the proposed modeling framework to address these issues.
In reality, households may exhibit diﬀerent preferences for driving due to socio-economic and demo-
graphic characteristics or intrinsic preferences. Without losing generality, we assume such heterogeneity in
behavior is captured by an error term ei. To facility analytical analysis, we further assume ei ∼ N(0, σ2),
although other distributions can also be adopted based on empirical evidence.
Following the modeling framework developed in this paper, the demand for driving Ai units of distance
for a household is determined by:
ln Ai = α ln(Y −C) − βp + ei (29)
and the corresponding indirect utility function is:
V(p,Y −C) = 1
β
exp(ei − βp) + 11 − α (Y −C)
1−α (30)
Following De Jong (1990), we can derive the utility of owning no vehicle by the same logic:
lim
p→∞V(p,Y) = U(0,Y) (31)
which yields:
U(0,Y) =
1
1 − αY
1−α (32)
Thus the probability of owning a car is:
P(p) = P{ 1
1 − α (Y −C)
1−α +
1
β
exp(ei − βp) ≥ 11 − αY
1−α} (33)
Denote:
ζ = log[Y1−α − (Y −C)1−α] − log(1 − α) + log β (34)
Then,
P(p) = 1 − Φ(ζ + βp
σ
) (35)
Also, because
log Ai = α log(Y −C) − βp + ei (36)
Average travel demand (e.g. measured in VMT) for the driving population is:
A˜(p) = E(A|ei ≥ ζ + βp) (37)
=
e
σ2
2 −βp[1 − Φ( ζ+βp−σ2
σ
)]
1 − Φ( ζ+βp
σ
)
(38)
Combining 35 and 38, the aggregated demand is:
q(p) = H(Y −C)1−αe σ22 −βp[1 − Φ(ζ + βp − σ
2
σ
)] (39)
We adopt the same supply function as in the previous analysis to derive the network equilibrium. We
assume σ takes a value of 0.35, which is consistent with (De Jong, 1990), although further calibration
is required before any application on real policy problems. Figure 5 illustrates the new aggregated travel
demand curve and equilibrium state where the demand and supply curves intersect.
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7. Application on Beijing Network
After extending the modeling framework to consider heterogeneity in behavior, we will further demon-
strate the capacity of the extended model using Beijing sketch network, a fairly large network where various
rationing policies have been implemented. In January, 2011, Chinese government initiated a vehicle license
plate lottery system to limit the rapid growth of vehicle ownership and usage in Beijing. Each month, about
20,000 license plates will be randomly distributed to people who are willing to buy vehicles. The entry fee
to participate is neglect-able comparing to household income so everyone who are willing to own a vehicle
has equal chance to get it. Also, the plates obtained from the lottery is not transferable, which prevents the
underground trading of the plates.
7.1. Vehicle Ownership Restriction through Lottery
In a future year, if no policy is implemented, HP(p0) of the households will own a vehicle in equilibrium.
The quota policy, will restrict the vehicle ownership, issuing θHP(p0) vehicle plates. Here θ ∈ (0, 1) will be
a policy variable the authority needs to decide on.
If the authority requires everyone to participate in the plate lottery, a new equilibrium point (p∗o, q∗o) will
be achieved. From 35, HP(p∗o) will enter the lottery to win the θHP(p0) number of vehicle plates. From 38,
their average VMT is A˜(p∗o). Thus, The new aggregated demand function will be:
q′ = θH(Y −C)α[1 − Φ(ζ + βp0
σ
)]
e
σ2
2 −βp[1 − Φ( ζ+βp−σ2
σ
)]
1 − Φ( ζ+βp
σ
)
(40)
The new equilibrium is given by the following equation set:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
q∗o = θH(Y −C)α[1 − Φ(
ζ + βp0
σ
)]
e
σ2
2 −βp∗o [1 − Φ( ζ+βp∗o−σ2
σ
)]
1 − Φ( ζ+βp∗o
σ
)
p∗o = φT0(1 + ξ(
q∗o
F
)ϕ).
(41)
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Since p∗o < p0, P(p∗o) > P(p0). The probability of winning the lottery  is:
 =
θ[1 − Φ( ζ+βp0
σ
)]
ζ+βp∗o
σ
< θ (42)
For each of the households that initially doesn’t own vehicles but enter the lottery system now and ac-
tually win it, their ei ∈ [ζ + βp∗o, ζ + βpo]. This type of households exists because under heterogenous
user assumption, households who chose not to drive before, but whose utility structure is close to the de-
cision of owning a vehicle may now ﬁnd driving is more beneﬁcial after the policy is implemented. Such
forward-looking behavior is considered in this analysis, although more behavioral study is needed to test
this assumption.
Since the probability of winning the lottery is given by 42, the total number of such households is
H(Φ( ζ+βp0
σ
) − Φ( ζ+βp∗o
σ
))
Their individual compensating variation gain CVi1 is given by the following equation:
1
1 − αY
1−α =
1
1 − α (Y −CV
i
1 −C)1−α +
1
β
exp(ei − βp∗o) (43)
By aggregating the CVi1’s, the CV change from this group of households CV
o
1 is:
CVo1 = H
ζ+βp0∫
ζ+βp∗o
{Y −C − [(Y1−α − 1 − α
β
eei−βp
∗
o ]
1
1−α
1√
2πσ
}e
e2i
2σ2 dei (44)
Then consider the households who initially own vehicles,their ei ∈ [ζ + βp0,+∞]. The total number of
such households is H(1 − Φ( ζ+βp0
σ
))
For the 1 −  portion of them who fail the lottery, their individual compensating variation CVi2 is given
by the following equation:
1
1 − α (Y −C)
1−α +
1
β
exp(ei − βp0) = 11 − α (Y −CV
i
2)
1−α (45)
By aggregating the CVi2’s, the CV change from this group of households (that would have owned a car
without the lottery system, but do not win the license plate lottery) CVo2 is:
CVo2 = (1 − )H
+∞∫
ζ+β+p0
{Y − [(Y −C)1−α + 1 − α
β
exp(−βp0 + ei)] 11−α } 1√
2πσ
e
e2i
2σ2 dei (46)
For the  portion of them who actually win the lottery, their individual compensating variation CVi3 is
given by the following equation:
1
1 − α (Y −C)
1−α +
1
β
exp(ei − βp0) = 11 − α (Y −C −CV
i
3)
1−α +
1
β
exp(ei − βp∗o) (47)
By aggregating the CVi3’s, the CV change from this group of households (that would have owned a car
without the lottery system, and luckily win the license plate lottery after the policy is implemented) CVo3 is:
CVo3 = H
+∞∫
ζ+β+p0
{(Y −C) − [(Y −C)1−α − 1 − α
β
eei (e−βp
∗
o − e−βp0 )] 11−α } 1√
2πσ
e
e2i
2σ2 dei (48)
The CV change for the whole society is thus:
CVo = CVo1 +CV
o
2 +CV
o
3 (49)
CVo1 and CV
o
3 are positive because of the mitigation of congestion by the implementation of the quota
system. CVo2 is negative due to the depriving of users from owning a vehicle.
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7.2. Numerical Example
This study seeks to demonstrate the proposed theoretical framework for travel demand management
policy analysis on large network. We use the Beijing Sketch Network (Figure 6), which contains 153
nodes, 544 links, and 153*153 OD pairs, for illustration.
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Fig. 6. Beijing Sketch Network
To be applicable for policy analysis in practice, models need to be carefully calibrated using locally
collected data. However, to calibrate a vehicle ownership model in a large city such as Beijing is very
complicated and is beyond the scope of this paper. For demonstration purpose, we use the 2010 census data
of Beijing and assume the population are evenly distributed within each District. We assume all VMT will
be equally allocated to 235 working days (52*5-25(holidays)) by each driver. For other parameters, we will
follow assumptions in section 5 and leave further calibration eﬀorts to future research.
One common challenge for integrated models such as the one proposed in this study is how to bridge
individual travel demand analysis with aggregate network statistics. According to the modeling framework,
demand for driving between each OD pair is decided by the average operating cost. The aggregated driving
demand (annual VMT) will then be translated into daily travel demand (trips), using average trip distance
derived by certain path usage assumptions (e.g. shortest path). However, after the traﬃc assignment is
conducted, the path ﬂow patterns may be very diﬀerent from initial assumptions, leading to a total VMT
diﬀerent from aggregate individual choices. This inconsistency requires us to reinvestigate the number of
trips using the new path usage pattern and the average trip distance associated with them. To get the path
ﬂow pattern from traﬃc assignment, this study uses the Gradient Project (GP) algorithm (Chen et al., 2002).
Although the path-based assignment algorithm is known for its non-uniqueness problem with assignment
results and a more integrated framework is preferable to ensure consistency between individual analysis and
macroscopic traﬃc assignment, this iterative process provides a practical solution with reasonable comput-
ing eﬃciency. We leave further investigation in this ﬁeld for future research.
After any changes in network conditions, the average operating cost between each OD pair will change.
This leads to new vehicle usage and ownership decisions for each individual. The aggregated individual
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choices will decide new network conditions collectively, which will in turn aﬀect congestion patterns and
operating cost. Therefore, people will adjust individual choices and new patterns will then be formed.
This iterative process will continue until nobody is willing to make changes. Welfare changes can then be
calculated. Figure 7 illustrates the framework for policy analysis on network.
1R
<HV
Fig. 7. Framework for Travel Demand Management Policy Analysis
Following the proposed framework, we investigated the welfare implications of the license plate lottery
on Beijing Sketch Network. The average volume/capacity ratio before any rationing policy is implemented
is 0.80. Figure 8 illustrates welfare changes under diﬀerent rationing ratio. The x axis represents the
remaining portion of drivers compared to the population who are willing to own a car before the lottery
policy is implemented. Under current assumptions of model parameter and network settings, the lottery
policy will always lead to a welfare loss. However, more model calibration work with local data is required
before any application in local policy analysis. Moreover, as illustrated in section 5, vehicle ownership
restriction may lead to welfare gains under certain congestion levels. Also, travelers between diﬀerent
origin destination pairs may have very diﬀerent experiences, ranging from huge welfare improvements to
signiﬁcant welfare losses. Further investigation in this direction may help to address equity concerns of
various travel demand management policies. Although only demonstrated through hypothetical scenarios,
with more calibration eﬀorts, the modeling framework proposed in this study will become a powerful tool
to support various policy analysis on large-scale metropolitan network.
8. Conclusions
As adverse environmental and economic impacts of excessive vehicle usage become more severe, some
mega-cities adopt vehicle usage and/or vehicle ownership rationing policies to directly control overall travel
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Fig. 8. Welfare Analysis for License Plate Lottery on Beijing Sketch Network
demand. These policies have not been adequately studied in literature. To bridge this gap, this study pro-
poses to analyze rationing policies by extending the joint model of vehicle ownership and mileage models.
The numerical analysis in this study suggests that the vehicle usage rationing policies can yield a higher
welfare gain when rationing ratio remains small, while vehicle ownership rationing becomes more advanta-
geous when the rationing ratio becomes suﬃciently large.
Analysis in this paper shows that with homogeneous users and the assumed demand function, the vehicle
usage could yield short term (when the induced demand is minimal and when travelers have not adapted
themselves to the new system by exploring various loopholes) social welfare gains, but will unavoidably lead
to long-term (when travelers have fully adapted themselves to the new system and explored all opportunities
to maximize their personal utility) social welfare losses. This study also compares rationing policies with
the more popular road pricing policy. When both policies achieve the same congestion mitigation eﬀects,
road pricing will always generate a bigger social welfare gain if no transaction cost is assumed.
Equity issues are a big concern for travel demand management policies. People usually argue against
pricing policy by pointing out that it favors people with high income. Models that are applicable for real
world policy analysis must be able to consider heterogeneity among travelers and large networks with mul-
tiple OD pairs. This study extended the theoretical framework to address these issues and its potentials are
demonstrated through applications on the Beijing sketch network. Various issues about modeling consis-
tency are discussed and an iterative approach is applied to provide practical solutions. However, to draw con-
vincing conclusions about policy implications, models need to be carefully calibrated with locally collected
data, which represents important directions for future research. If well calibrated and carefully applied,
models built in this study could provide a powerful theoretical framework for analyzing a set of policies that
is attracting growing interest.
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Appendix A. Summary of Notation
α: Income elasticity of driving;
β: Price elasticity of driving;
η: household socio-economic and demographic characteristics;
φ: Value of time;
1 − θ: Vehicle ownership rationing ratio;
1 − λ: Vehicle usage rationing ratio;
ξ, ϕ: Parameters in BPR function;
A(p): Annual VMT by a household;
Au(p): Annual household VMT after vehicle usage rationing;
C: Annualized capital cost of owning a car;
CS u: Aggregated consumer surplus gain after vehicle usage rationing without induced demand ;
CVo,θ: Compensating variation for individual household who keeps their vehicles after vehicle owner-
ship rationing;
CVo,1−θ: Compensating variation for individual household who no longer owns vehicles after rationing;
CVo: Aggregated compensating variation after vehicle ownership rationing;
CVu,λ: Compensating variation for individual driving household after vehicle usage rationing with in-
duced demand;
CVu: Aggregated compensating variation after vehicle usage rationing with induced demand;
F: Road capacity;
H: Number of households;
p: operation cost per mile;
p0: Maximal operation cost beyond which nobody is willing to drive;
P: Percentage of households who own vehicles;
q: Aggregated travel demand;
q0: Total driving amount at the critical price p0;
qu: Aggregated travel demand under vehicle usage rationing;
(q∗, p∗): Network equilibrium point;
(q∗∗o , p∗∗o ): Network equilibrium point after vehicle ownership rationing;
(q∗∗u , p∗∗u ): Equilibrium point under vehicle usage rationing with induced demand;
t(q): Travel time;
T0: Free-ﬂow travel time;
U(A, X): Direct utility function;
V(p,Y −C): Indirect utility function;
Vusage(p,Y −C): Indirect utility function after vehicle usage rationing;
Y: Annual household income;
